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Abstract: Many global challenges cannot be addressed by one single actor alone. Achieving
sustainability requires governance by state and non-state market actors to jointly realise public
values and corporate goals. As a form of public–private governance, voluntary standards involving
governments, non-governmental organisations and companies have gained much traction in
recent years and have been in the limelight of public authorities and policymakers. From a firm
perspective, sustainability standards can be a way to demonstrate that they engage in corporate
social responsibility (CSR) in a credible way. To capitalise on their CSR activities, firms need to
ensure their stakeholders are able to recognise and assess their CSR quality. However, because the
relative observability of CSR is low and since CSR is a contested concept, information asymmetries
in firm–stakeholder relationships arise. Adopting CSR standards and using these as signalling
devices is a strategy for firms to reduce these information asymmetries, by revealing their true CSR
quality. Against this background, this article investigates the voluntary ISO 26000 standard for
social responsibility as a form of public-private governance and contends that, despite its objectives,
this standard suffers from severe signalling problems. Applying signalling theory to the ISO 26000
standard, this article takes a critical stance towards this standard and argues that firms adhering to
this standard may actually emit signals that compromise rather than enhance stakeholders’ ability to
identify and interpret firms’ underlying CSR quality. Consequently, the article discusses the findings
in the context of public-private governance, suggests a specification of signalling theory and identifies
avenues for future research.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; signalling theory; information asymmetry; ISO 26000;
sustainability standards; private governance; public-private governance
1. Introduction
Whether it is on a local, national or global level, achieving sustainability requires governance by
state and non-state market actors. In fact, scholars, policymakers and business leaders have recognised
that, as forms of “governance beyond government”, private governance and public-private governance
are key for effectively dealing with some of the most pressing social and ecological challenges,
such as combatting climate, eradicating poverty and deforestation [1]. In this context, corporate
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives taken by firms, including codes of conduct, sustainability
reporting, and the adoption of voluntary standards in the social and ecological domain, can be seen as
a manifestation of private governance. In efforts to jointly realise public values and corporate goals,
voluntary CSR and sustainability standards involving governments, non-governmental organisations
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and companies have emerged as a promising form of public-private governance. The uptake of these
forms of public-private governance has gained much traction in recent years and has increasingly
received recognition from public authorities and policymakers. As a result, public-private governance
has become an integral part of the repertoire of policy arrangements [2–4].
In addition to contributing to societal goals, firms seek to realise financial and economic value
from their CSR activities. To capitalise on their efforts, firms need to ensure their stakeholders are
able to recognise and assess their “CSR quality”, understood as a firm’s CSR commitments, actions
and performance. Firms encounter at least two problems here. First, the relative observability of an
organisation’s CSR quality is generally low due its dominant orientation on internal processes [5–8].
Second, the essentially-contested nature of the CSR concept implies that firms need to develop
idiosyncratic interpretations of CSR, based on their respective characteristics and contexts [9–11].
The co-existence of many firm-specific meanings attributed to CSR may compromise stakeholders’
ability to gauge these interpretations.
These problems cause information asymmetries in firm-stakeholder relationships. To reduce
information asymmetries, firms pursue sensegiving and sensemaking communication strategies using
a variety of media and messages to reveal their true CSR quality [12,13]. However, research indicates
that a majority of stakeholders appears to believe firms do not communicate about CSR honestly [14]
and demonstrations of symbolic CSR implementation and corporate misconduct have raised concerns
about firms’ credibility [15,16].
1.1. Sustainability Standards
Efficacious signalling of CSR quality thus is a key challenge for firms. As a manifestation of
private governance in the context of public goals, voluntary sustainability standards [2,17] represent
a way for firms to demonstrate that they engage in CSR in a credible way. Defined by Rasche ([18],
p. 263) as “predefined rules and procedures for organizational behavior with regard to ( . . . ) issues that are
usually not required by law”, CSR standards in this context not only have a function in disciplining firm
behaviour, but also function as a signalling device.
Being a prominent example of a voluntary corporate sustainability standard, the ISO 26000
standard for social responsibility covers subjects across the entire CSR domain, providing guidance
instead of being a certifiable management systems standard that contains requirements and propagates
a dominantly moral rather than strategic perspective on CSR [3,19]. As such, it represents an innovation
in standards development [20,21]. ISO 26000 is the result of a global stakeholder-inclusive development
process that took place under the auspice of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO),
providing the standard with a high level of legitimacy [19,22,23]. Various reports [24–27] show that
ISO 26000 has become a commonly used standard by companies worldwide and that the interest for
adhering to the standard is steadily growing. In addition, ISO standards are an integral part of public
policy in both environmental and social domains and are, for instance, used in public procurement
processes and applied to stimulate effective sustainability governance in international trade [28].
However, despite these positive signs several characteristics of ISO 26000 may cause it to
suffer from severe signalling problems. Firms adhering to the standard could consequently well
emit signals that compromise rather than enhance stakeholders’ ability to identify and interpret
firms’ underlying CSR quality and thus may engage in adverse CSR communication that maintains
information asymmetries. This article investigates this proposition by examining literature on CSR
standards, ISO 26000 and developments in the practical realm of the standard through the lens of
signalling theory (ST). Focusing on firm behaviour, CSR communication, firm-stakeholder interaction
and information asymmetries, the framework of ST allows for a relevant and critical examination of
ISO 26000 that relates to (potential) problems associated with this standard. Taking a critical stance,
this article develops arguments based on the type of standard ISO 26000 represents, its contents and
developments in the CSR standards environment that have followed since its publication.
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1.2. Academic and Practical Contribution
This article aims to make an academic contribution in several ways. Its main contribution is that
it provides one of the few empirical applications of ST in the context of CSR, answering the call of
Connelly et al. [29] to tap ST’s potential in the field of sustainability and to explore further specifications
of ST. Against the background that ISO standards are a “coagulated” manifestation of public-private
governance, the analysis may also offer novel insights for the field of public-private governance.
Notably, ISO 26000 makes a particularly interesting case for analysis since it differs significantly from
other instruments in the public-private governance realm, including reporting standards, certification
schemes, labelling and roundtables. In addition, focussing on ST provides an additional lens to
examine CSR (communications) beyond the commonly used lenses of legitimacy theory, institutional
theory, stakeholder theory and accountability [30]. Finally, while others have examined ISO 26000
from the perspective of developing it as a guidance or certifiable standard [31] and have hinted on
signalling aspects of the standard [20], this article is the first to assess ISO 26000 from the perspective of
ST. In addition, in addition, applying ST to ISO 26000 gives rise to a further specification of theoretical
concepts within the ST framework for analysing patterns of CSR communication.
Practical relevance of this article lies in the implications of analysing ISO 26000 as a problematic
signal for firms that want to demonstrate their CSR quality to secure legitimacy through the standard
or which are requiring ISO 26000 adherence from suppliers and subcontractors. The analysis points
at the necessity of using additional signalling strategies for ISO 26000-adhering firms, contains
advice to standardisation and certification organisations that aim to design efficacious CSR standards,
and provides suggestions for policy makers that want to encourage corporate transparency on CSR.
The article starts by discussing ST’s theoretical basis, distinguishing between two central types of
information asymmetry. Next, it provides an account of ISO 26000, including its main characteristics
and consequences in the CSR standards environment. It then turns to analysing ISO 26000 with ST
concepts. Finally, the article reflects on the analysis and suggests both a specification of ST and avenues
for future research.
2. Signalling Theory: Focus and Key Concepts
Sprouted from the work of Akerlof [32], Spence [33], and Stiglitz [34], ST relates to a substantial
body of academic work in economical contract theory focusing on information asymmetries between
multiple entities, such as individuals or organisations. In particular, ST is concerned with how
one entity—the agent or insider—may undertake actions to signal its underlying quality to reduce
information asymmetries. This underlying quality is often hard to observe or unobservable to another
entity—the principal or outsider [29]. ST therefore revolves around “problems of social selection under
conditions of imperfect information” ([29], p. 63).
Signals can be defined as snapshots pointing to unobservable signaller qualities at a given point
in time [35]. They constitute messages or images communicated from one entity to another. Quality
refers to attributes or abilities of the signaller to fulfil the needs or demands of an outsider observing
the signal [29].
A central assumption behind ST is that the entity that does not have certain information at its
disposal is usually willing to pay a(n) (in)tangible premium to the entity that reveals its attributes
through signals. ST essentially formulates propositions about strategies for (in)action in the context of
costs and benefits under different levels of opacity or transparency, on the side of both the signaller
and the signal receiver. ST suggests that firms provide information that could be used by individuals
or constituent groups that are seeking to form impressions about the firm, its values and its overall
future direction [36]. It primarily addresses “the deliberate communication of positive information in an
effort to convey positive organizational attributes” ([29], p. 44) that represent imperceptible underlying
qualities and can be a powerful explanation for the conduct of firms and their constituents and their
patterns of interaction.
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2.1. ST concepts
In their review of ST, Connelly et al. [29] distilled several key theoretical concepts. These include:
(1) signals of quality and intent; (2) the efficacy of signalling by high-quality and low-quality firms;
(3) signal honesty and signal fi; and (4) signal frequency and consistency.
Signals of quality and intent. In ST, a basic distinction is made between information signalling
the quality and intent of an organisation. Signals of quality relate to the communication of a certain
organisational characteristic in order to obtain legitimacy with signal receivers (e.g., CSR quality).
Signals of intent “indicate future action, possibly conditional on the receiver’s response” ([29], p. 60). Through
these signals, firms inform stakeholders about their aspirations or resolutions.
Efficacy of signalling by high-quality and low-quality firms. Though important, the fact that a signal is
observable is not a sufficient condition for it to be efficacious. Connelly et al. [29] wrote that signals
need to have the characteristic of being costly as well. Signals that incur costs from signallers show that
some signallers may be better able to absorb the associated costs than others. Some firms may pursue
social initiatives even if they imply economic losses [37,38]. The signal may hence send the message
that the signaller be perceived as more credible or honest in its claim to possess a certain quality.
Signal honesty and signal fit. Signal honesty relates to the coupling of formal plans and subsequent
actions and is defined as “the extent to which the signaller actually has the underlying quality associated with
the signal” ([29], p. 45), bearing some similarity to the previously addressed distinction between signal
intent and signal quality. Signal fit can be defined as the degree to which a signal correlates with the
unobservable quality of the signaller. This notion implies that situations may occur in which a signaller
sends out signals that do not correlate well with the signaller’s unobservable quality [39,40]. In the
context of CSR, such misalignment is usually perceived as greenwashing [41,42]. The discrepancy
between the signal and the quality of the signaller—either actual or perceived—is hence due to poor
signalling, which may either be caused by the quality of the signal or the integrity of the signaller.
Signal fit and signal honesty together comprise signal reliability, which closely relates to the notion
of credibility [29].
Signal frequency and consistency. Firms can enhance the effectiveness of their signalling by means of
sending a larger spectrum of observable signals or by increasing the number of signals emitted, which is
called signal frequency. Connelly et al. [29] pointed at the possibility for signallers to signal repetitively
to keep reducing information asymmetries and increase the effectiveness of the signalling process.
This especially applies when a firm uses multiple types of signals to convey the same message [43].
A related concept to signal frequency is that of signal consistency, which Connelly et al. defined as
the agreement between multiple signals from one particular source. Signal consistency may help
mitigate the problem of communication becoming less effective as uncorresponding or conflicting
signals confuse the receiver [44,45].
While other concepts can be distinguished in literature on ST, Connelly et al. [29] considered the
above to cover key categories within ST. This article takes these categories as its point of reference
for analysing ISO 26000 from a signalling perspective (Although these categories may partly overlap,
for purposes of analysis, they are treated as conceptually separate in this article).
2.2. Observing CSR Signals: Within-Firm and between-Firm Information Asymmetries
Voluntary in nature, CSR represents an integral part of corporate strategy and is concerned
with the responsibility a firm takes for the social and environmental impacts of its (in)actions and its
responsiveness to the legitimate concerns and expectations of its stakeholders and broader society
about these impacts [46,47]. CSR discourse is dominated by instrumental and strategic approaches
rather than moral orientations towards CSR, emphasising the economic benefits that firms can gain
by addressing their social and environmental responsibilities [48,49]. In this context, CSR is an
important underlying quality to signal to stakeholders as firms seek to capitalise on their investments in
managing sustainability impacts, product and business model innovation and corporate philanthropy.
As Johnston ([5], p. 7) put it: “[u]nless firms can find a credible signal of CSR, the positive potential of
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the market may go unrealized”. Literature has pointed at the value of signalling CSR as a beneficial
firm characteristic that sends investors the message that they can anticipate future firm profits,
that helps building a good corporate image and reputation among customers, (future) employees
and regulators, cultivates trust among corporate constituents and that can enhance the credibility of
CSR claims [5,50–54]. Scholars have also suggested that organisations may signal their CSR quality in
response to stakeholder demands or to differentiate themselves from competitors, providing them
with greater legitimacy in the marketplace [13,30,55–59].
In its simplest form, ST’s primary focus is on information asymmetries between two entities,
the signaller and the signal receiver. However, in the realm of CSR, firms experience strong incentives
to signal their CSR quality. Receiver attention for signals of CSR quality has surged. A recent survey
by Globescan [14] demonstrates that a large majority of corporate stakeholders are interested to learn
about firms’ CSR engagement. Connelly et al. ([29], p. 60) rightfully argued that the field of CSR
presents an interesting research area from the perspective from ST: “as many stakeholders such as host
communities, employees, and customers become increasingly concerned about sustainability, how can firms
signal their commitment to a sustainable enterprise?” This has led to a proliferation of signals, including the
use product labels, advertising responsible products, sponsoring worthy causes, issuing press releases
about CSR initiatives, engaging in strategic stakeholder dialogue and publishing comprehensive
sustainability reports, making competitive signalling important. In the face of information asymmetry,
firms with good performance will try to find ways of signalling the relative superiority of their
performance to increase observability [60].
Consequently, this spree of CSR communication causes relationships between firms and their
stakeholders to be characterised by two types of information asymmetries in particular: within-firm and
between-firm information asymmetries. Within-firm information asymmetries concern the inherent
opacity of underlying CSR quality and its relative unobservability to stakeholders. In many cases,
a firm’s CSR quality is hard to observe or even unobservable for transacting partners due to the
prevalent orientation of CSR activities on internal business processes rather than its integration in
the development of new products, the exploration of new markets and the innovation of business
models [5–8]. To the extent firms communicate their CSR engagement to reduce information
asymmetry, only a part of signal receivers appear to think that companies communicate honestly
about CSR [14]. As Lydenberg ([61], p. 61] observed: “Although an increasing number of corporations
publish environmental and health and safety reports, many are simply token efforts—greenwashing—and few
address the full range of social issues necessary to asses adequately a corporation’s behaviour.” In other words,
the inconvenient truth for firms here is that assumptions of greenwashing seem to be a starting point
in assessing communication on their social and environmental responsibilities. These conjectures
thus point at a subtler concept of unobservability: while a firm tries to signal its CSR quality to
reduce problems of information asymmetry, many stakeholders tend to think that the information
revealed to them does not reflect the organisation’s true underlying quality or may be communicated
to consciously obscure rather than reveal observability. Signalling CSR then results in maintaining
information asymmetries as stakeholder perception may trump truth.
A second type of information asymmetries relates to between-firm observability and concerns the
idiosyncrasy of the CSR concept. The contested, multifaceted, and vague nature of CSR [10,11,62,63]
requires company-specific interpretations of the concept to acquire meaning [9,64]. While such
interpretations may benefit stakeholders’ understanding of the CSR quality of a particular firm,
this also implies that substantial differences between management approaches to, incomparable
renditions of, and widely varying communications strategies for CSR, even of similar firms that
are in direct competition with each other, are scattered around the marketplace [13,65,66]. As a
result, CSR (minimum) norms and performance benchmarks are unclear to signal receivers, making it
hard for stakeholders to gauge, differentiate between and make inferences about companies’ signals
about their comparative CSR quality. This leads to preservation of information asymmetries in
business-stakeholder relationships.
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3. A Standard for Signalling CSR: Understanding ISO 26000
In this context, CSR standards can serve as efficacious signalling devices for firms to reduce
information asymmetries. By increasing the observability of firms’ underlying CSR quality and through
providing common frameworks for interpreting and implementing CSR, they enable firms and their
stakeholders to cope with problems associated with within-firm and between-firm observability
of CSR. CSR standards offer a shared point of orientation and an agreed-upon language in a
fragmented domain and thus carry a legitimising function for guiding CSR behaviour [67–70].
Terlaak [71] argued that standards may create order without law in settings characterised by incomplete
consensus and information and capture in a written and codified form “how things should be
done”. Several standards allow firms to obtain certification for their demonstrated compliance
through second- or third-party auditing. Certification functions as an enforcement mechanism
that cultivates accountability and disciplines corporate conduct, ensuring—at least to a certain
extent—signal honesty and fit. Certification allows firms to explain and justify their behaviour,
enabling stakeholders to pass better informed judgments and facing sanctions when they do not
comply with the designated norms [72].
Over the past two decades, the CSR domain has witnessed a proliferation of complementary
and competing standards. Representing exclusive or exhaustive categories, types of standards that
have emerged include principle-based standards, reporting-based standards, certification standards,
process standards and integrating guidance-based standards [17,73,74]. Amidst the proliferation of
CSR standards, ISO took the initiative to develop ISO 26000, a comprehensive CSR standard that
offers guidance for understanding and interpreting CSR, formulating and implementing CSR policy
and communicating CSR. Published in late 2010, the standard marks a deviation from the closely
related category of management systems standards in the CSR realm (e.g., ISO 14001, ISO 9001,
OHSAS 18001, SA 8000) which contain process and performance requirements and are certifiable.
Whereas widely used standards such as the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and the
Global Reporting Initiative guidelines through their own enforcement mechanisms (communication
on progress requirement and application levels respectively) mandate firm behaviour, ISO 26000
contains no enforcement mechanisms at all. Hahn [20] labels ISO 26000 as an innovation in standards
development, “intended to enhance (or induce) a [management system] with regard to content and structure
by systematically promoting (or introducing) continuous discourse processes” ([20], p. 720). This type of
standards focuses on providing guidance on contents, process and dialogue, facilitating stakeholder
interaction and organisational learning.
ISO 26000 was developed in the largest-ever stakeholder consultation process, involving
institutional stakeholders from more than 90 countries and hundreds of international delegates and
experts in the field of CSR that deliberated and negotiated on aspects of the standards for more than
five years. This inclusive nature and procedural fairness of the development process, its consensual
orientation, and its transparency led the standard to possess a high level of legitimacy [19,22,23,75].
Its broad-based contents were inspired by many other authoritative standards, conventions,
guidelines, codes of conduct, etc. ISO 26000 specifies expectations and related actions for guiding
firm behaviour in the realm of CSR in order to “provides guidance on the underlying principles of social
responsibility, recognizing social responsibility and engaging stakeholders, the core subjects and issues pertaining
to social responsibility and on ways to integrate socially responsible behaviour into the organization” ([26],
p. vi). The standard has a strong stakeholder orientation [76,77] and, although recognising the business
imperative for addressing social and environmental responsibilities, takes a dominantly moral instead
of an instrumental or strategic approach to CSR. The standard builds on the idiosyncratic character
of the CSR concept encouraging firms to develop their own interpretation of CSR within the general
confinements of the principles and CSR subjects it specifies [3,78]. As such, it can be considered as a
multi-stakeholder initiative to create a form of public-private governance in the context of the roles or
organisations in achieving sustainability.
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In a comparison of ISO 26000 vis-à-vis other standards, Hahn [20] argued that ISO 26000 provides
opportunities for signalling CSR beyond certification on a direct level of interaction with stakeholders:
“While possible de-coupling tendencies in third-party certificates might induce a loss of confidence in the respective
conventional standards, such alternative modes of signalling potentially enable a more credible implementation
[of CSR]” (p. 724). He also concluded that ISO 26000 holds particular value for firms that are in the
beginning stages of CSR implementation. Webb [79] argued that ISO 26000 is an innovative rule
instrument that contains bridging functions in addressing public and private transnational business
governance interactions, including the standard’s compatibility with other global CSR standards and
the function of the standard as an emerging global CSR custom to address firm behaviour.
The standard seems to be well-received by firms. A recent report of the European Commission [25]
based on research among 200 European companies shows that 40 per cent refer to at least one
internationally recognised CSR standard, while 33 per cent of the companies in the research
refer to at least the UNGC, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) or ISO
26000. ISO post-publication surveys indicate that adoption of the standard is gaining traction
worldwide [24,26,27].
The characteristics of the standard have led to various responses by organisations in the CSR
standards environment, including national standardisation bodies and certification organisations.
As many firms seek to certify their CSR engagement, various national standardisation bodies (e.g.,
in Denmark, Portugal, and Brazil) have developed certifiable CSR management systems based on ISO
26000 standards, such as the Danish DS 49001. A consortium of internationally active certification
organisations have developed and launched a certifiable management systems standard as response
to the publication of ISO 26000, called the CSR Performance Ladder. Other standardisation bodies
(e.g., in the Netherlands, Sweden, and France) have initiated the development of a self-declaration
strategies to evidence the CSR claims of firms adhering to ISO 26000 in a systematic way. The Dutch
national standardisation body has developed a self-declaration protocol which was laid down in
a guideline that now serves as the basis for a proposal to formally acknowledge this strategy
within the international ISO network. A self-declaration contains structured information about
an organisation’s claim that it works in accordance with ISO 26000 and can be subjected to an
external audit. Accompanying this initiative is the availability of an online publication platform
for organisations to issue an ISO 26000 self-declaration.
4. Analysing ISO 26000 with ST
The nature, contents and consequences of the ISO 26000 standard on the one hand and its promise
and take-up by firms on the other hand occasion investigating the signalling value of ISO 26000.
In the next sections, ISO 26000 is examined with ST along the lines of the earlier mentioned concepts.
The analysis subsequently focuses on the extent to which ISO 26000 can be viewed as a signal of quality
and intent, to what extent the standard is an efficacious signal, signal honesty and fit, and signal
frequency and consistency. The analysis incorporates aspects related to the nature and the contents of
the standard as well as their consequences in the CSR standards environment.
4.1. Signal of Quality and Intent
Adherence to ISO 26000 may dominantly signal a company’s intent to engage in CSR. Rather than
containing requirements for taking appropriate action or specifying performance levels, it merely offers
guidance to firms in interpreting CSR and formulating their CSR policy and CSR implementation.
Although the standard emphasises “the importance of results and improvements in performance” ([80],
p. vi), it neither specifies performance levels for companies in terms of reducing negative social and
environmental impacts nor provides accepted or general benchmarks. Hahn [20], in this respect,
pointed at the possibility that the adoption of standards as institutionalised rules does not necessarily
improve operational efficiency [81–83]. Similar fears were expressed by Schwartz and Tilling [84] who
argued that ISO 26000 focuses “on management techniques and related rituals, rather than on actual outcomes
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in terms of more responsible actions” ([84], p. 292). This means that a firm’s intention to engage in CSR is
decoupled from its actual engagement in CSR and its performance, or CSR quality.
In the absence of appropriate governance or enforcement mechanisms (e.g., certification, required
communication on progress), there are few thresholds for claiming ISO 26000 adherence and the
standard may even tempt firms that do not possess the CSR quality to signal. This is especially the
case when relationships between firms and their stakeholders are characterised by within-firm and
between-firm observability of CSR. The low exigencies of ISO 26000 imply the presence of a risk of
incongruence between a firm’s CSR claim and its actual CSR actions, compromising the credibility
of the firm that communicates that it adheres to the standard, the CSR concept in general and the
standard itself [85,86]. Information that signals a firm’s actual CSR quality (e.g., relative or absolute
reduction of carbon emissions, measures the company has taken to find alternatives for the use of
deplete-prone natural resources, and information on the working conditions in overseas factories)
rather than its intent ultimately determine its credibility in the marketplace.
In the realm of standards, performance can also be conceived of in another way. Various authors
have placed ISO 26000 within quality management-oriented approaches towards CSR [20,67,87].
Such approaches are known for their focus on continuous improvement from a systematic
plan-do-check-act perspective [87–89] and may be considered to constitute a commitment to improving
performance and optimising the efficiency of internal business operations rather than the achievement
of ambitious performance levels and innovation. The option of ISO 26000 self-declaration does not
solve these problems as this self-declaration is essentially only an exercise in illustrating adherence to
the standard, not in performance (see also Section 4.3).
In his analysis of ISO 26000, Hahn [20] concluded that the standard is particularly suited for firms
that are in the beginning stages of CSR implementation. He argued that ISO 26000 “can serve as an
introduction into the main concepts of [CSR] and it can help by introducing relevant instruments, initiatives
and core elements of an management system for those organizations which are still in the initial stage of
implementing [CSR] into orderly management processes. ( . . . ) For companies beginning to realize their [social
responsibilities], ISO 26000 with its content-focus can be a starting point for implementing it into organizational
management processes” ([20], pp. 722–724). While firms in early stages of CSR development may possess
a certain CSR quality, it can be assumed that this quality is still underdeveloped and can be considered
to be primarily reflecting an intention to further develop their CSR quality. ISO 26000 thus seems to
signal intent over performance.
4.2. Efficacy of the Signal
ISO 26000’s lack of proper verification and enforcement mechanisms hampers the ability of signal
receivers to distinguish between firms with different CSR quality. Such mechanisms can function as
useful discriminators between companies of high and low quality [29,70,90]. Related to the cost aspect
of efficacious signalling, certification or other second- or third-party conformity assessments provides
an illustration of this: high-performing firms generally incur lower certification costs because their
practices are already up to par and because better firm capabilities contribute to the reduction of costs
related to making the necessary adjustments to qualify for certification [8,29,90,91]. In the case of ISO
26000, however, producing the signal would incur little cost and claiming adherence to the standard
would merely require symbolic or selective implementation of change from the organisation. From the
perspective of ST, poor-performing firms may experience superior benefits from signalling over
non-signalling too and conclude that these benefits outweigh the minor costs involved. High-quality
firms are consequently not motivated by arguments of costly signalling to claim that they are working
according to ISO 26000 as it does not offer them a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the proverbial cheap
talk of low-quality firms. ISO 26000 is thus likely to lead to an uninformative “pooling equilibrium”
instead of a “separating equilibrium” in which firms can be clearly distinguished [56,92].
The costs incurred by firms as a result of going through an ISO 26000 self-declaration protocol,
such as the ones that are available in the Netherlands, Sweden and France, will probably not be a
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burden for low-quality firms to signal their adherence to the standard. Although there is a fee involved
in publishing a firm’s self-declaration on the Dutch ISO 26000 publication platform, and even though
the exercise to comply with the applicable guideline requires effort from firms, these burdens may
prove to be too low for firms to become reluctant to adhering to the standard in the face of the benefits
of doing so.
A final observation on the cost characteristic of signal efficacy relates to the standard’s
interpretation of CSR. Since this interpretation is dominantly normatively-oriented rather than
reflecting a strategic or business case orientation towards CSR, one could argue that, by adhering
to ISO 26000, firms choose to respond to stakeholders’ and society’s expectations primarily from a
moral point of view rather than through aligning these interests with their own from a profit-seeking
motive [77,78]. As such, adhering to ISO 26000 could indicate that firms opt for a mode of CSR that
signals they are prepared to sacrifice profits in the public interest [37,53], leading the standard to
account for a costly signal.
The absence of required verification mechanisms such as certification and communications on
progress requirement also relate to the observability aspect of efficacious signalling as firms are unable
to make their CSR quality visible through these mechanisms. The observability of the CSR quality of
ISO 26000-adhering firms is further hampered as neither a public register of companies that adhere to
the standard nor a clearinghouse system for ISO 26000 exists. While ISO post-publication surveys have
observed a substantial increase in the number of firms that seem to be interested in and adopting ISO
26000 [26,27], it is impossible to determine how many firms and which firms have adopted the standard
or even obtain a sensible proxy of this. While not being available for ISO 26000, such provisions are
available for many certifiable standards, enabling stakeholders to obtain detailed information on for
instance a firm’s certification and related data, including the scope of its certification, prior certifications,
the period through which the certification is valid, non-conformances, possibly related certifications
and firms’ management declarations on the topic. Initiatives have however been taken in the context of
ISO 26000 that aim to do exactly the opposite: blacklisting companies that wrongfully claim that they
have been ISO 26000 certified or are saying that they intend to obtain certification with the standard
and showcasing bad practice [93].
As a final point, one of the ways firms can increase the observability of their CSR quality is
through disclosing their CSR quality in greater clarity, whereas firms with poor performance will
obfuscate their poor quality by using complex and difficult wording, a phenomenon known as the
obfuscation hypothesis [94,95]. In a way, ISO 26000 permits vague wording as the standard allows for
idiosyncratic approaches to and interpretations of CSR. Any interpretation of CSR is in fact acceptable
for the standard as long as it remains within the general confinements of the standards’ CSR definition,
CSR principles and CSR core subjects. Similarly, Hemphill [21], in this regard, said that ISO 26000 is too
broad in its scope, implying that it cannot serve a useful purpose in the context of specific industries
and sectors in terms of being a meaningful CSR signal.
4.3. Signal Honesty and Fit
Lacking verification and enforcement mechanisms and the fact that there are hardly any costs
involved in signalling adherence to ISO 26000 for firms, make the standard susceptible for false
signalling, thereby compromising signal honesty. The low exigencies of ISO 26000 make it easy for
companies to polish or even fake underlying qualities and may tempt or encourage firms spitefully
wanting to claim an engagement in CSR to only partly implement changes for cosmetic purposes [41,69].
As high-quality firms may be discouraged to signal when low-quality firms can easily send the same
signal, the standard could even become a symbol of false signalling, inferior norms and outright deceit.
This could lead to dire adverse effects in the face of the standard’s objectives, including consciously
misinforming stakeholders and obscured purposeful corporate misconduct.
In addition, and as illustrated above, ISO 26000 is particularly concerned with signalling a firm’s
intention to engage in CSR rather than its CSR performance, rendering it difficult for stakeholders to
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distinguish between the different signals they receive from different companies and assess these by
gauging the extent to which these signals fit firms’ underlying CSR quality. Stakeholder assessment
of the honesty of a firm’s CSR signals is further impeded by the tendency of the standard to
decouple action from performance [78,84], making the standard subject to moral hazard as a result
of opportunistic firm behaviour. At its best, ISO 26000 would enable stakeholders to differentiate
organisations based on their intent to engage in CSR initiatives rather than their actual engagement
in these initiatives or the social and environmental effects their engagement engenders. However,
it is clear that judging firms based on their intentions may be a precarious exercise in the first place;
the litmus test for distinguishing between credible companies ultimately lies in demonstrating CSR
performance and hence in evidenced information that signals a firm’s quality. Signal honesty thus
seems hard to determine in the context of firms that adhere to ISO 26000, especially when compared
to, for example, the certifiable environmental management systems standard ISO 14001 and the
certifiable variants for ISO 26000 that have been developed to date. ISO 26000 hence upholds
between-firm asymmetries.
The aforementioned is inextricably linked to problems in determining the degree to which the
signal emitted by firms about their adherence to ISO 26000 correlates with their underlying CSR quality
(i.e., signal fit). This may be considered an inherent flaw resulting from the type of standard and the
approach to CSR that ISO 26000 represents and points to a phenomenon that can be called the paradox
of idiosyncrasy. As the standard leaves a lot of interpretation and application of the CSR concept up to
individual firms, the messages that are communicated by firms about their supposed CSR quality may
actually reflect their CSR quality well, indicating a high level of signal fit. However, exactly because of
the fact that ISO 26000 revolves around company-specific CSR interpretations and implementation,
signal fit is very hard to determine for stakeholders and may lead to confusion when they compare
even similar firms to each other [9,64]. ISO 26000 may represent a range of CSR interpretations that are
used by firms, leading the same signal (i.e., a firm’s adherence to ISO 26000) to reflect very different
approaches to interpreting and implementing CSR and thus hamper the reduction of between-firm
information asymmetries.
The notion of signal fit becomes even more problematic when one takes into account the results of
empirical research by Perera [96] on the relevance of the contents of ISO 26000 for SMEs. These results
indicate that only a small number of the CSR principles, core subjects and issues that are specified by
ISO 26000 are seen as being of sufficient material importance for SMEs. This is attributed to the lack of
involvement of SME representatives in the ISO 26000 development process [76,97].
4.4. Signal Frequency and Consistency
Under the condition that signals correspond with each other, signalling effectiveness can be
enhanced by sending a larger number of observable signals or increasing the number of signals emitted
to reduce information asymmetry [29]. In terms of signal frequency and consistency, ISO 26000 in itself
does not necessarily give rise to any particular signalling problems: a firm can signal its adherence to
the standard at will and in myriad ways (e.g., through press releases, sustainability reports, corporate
presentations or social media) under the homogenous label of ISO 26000. However, ISO 26000 does not
have the advantage of offering the possibility to communicate about the results of mandatory periodic
conformity assessments such as external audits, re-certification, voluntary assurance statements or
regular progress reports that other CSR standards offer. ISO 26000-adhering firms may thus be missing
out on opportunities to signal about formal milestones on fixed intervals related to their standards
adherence. The fact that alternative standards that have been developed for ISO 26000 are certifiable
may therefore reinforce the competitive signalling dynamics in favour of these alternatives, further
reducing the relative degree of observability of ISO 26000 (between-firm information asymmetries).
Another aspect of signal frequency lies in the signalling environment of ISO 26000. The Dutch
context proves a case-in-point: communications by the national standards body NEN on organisations
that have adopted ISO 26000, for instance, seem to be much less frequent than that of the
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certification institutions that have developed the CSR Performance Ladder, a prominent substitute
CSR management systems standard in the Netherlands that was inspired by ISO 26000 and which
is certifiable. Certification institutions arguably have stronger marketing and business incentives
to communicate about their product and related supporting and certification services as they
will financially benefit from both the process leading to certification and the certification itself.
This incentive has become even stronger as the CSR Performance Ladder is not endorsed by NEN or
the national CSR knowledge centre in the Netherlands. Without this institutional backing, certification
organisations are required to put more effort in marketing communications. As consultancies may
also benefit from market demand for obtaining certification according to the CSR Performance Ladder
through offering advisory, implementation and audit services, they have an incentive to communicate
about this standard as well [98].
Despite the standard itself not representing problems in signal consistency for firms, ISO 26000
may well give rise to such problems to occur. For ISO 26000-adhering firms to make their CSR quality
better observable and reduce information asymmetries between them and their stakeholders, engaging
in additional signalling strategies is required [4]. As illustrated above, the standard only allows for
limited signalling, both in terms of the number and diversity of signals. Firms that work with ISO
26000 have multiple options to strengthen their signals, including the adoption of issue-based CSR
standards (e.g., SA 8000 and ISO 14001) or adhering to other comprehensive CSR standards that are
either mandatorily or voluntary subject to enforcement mechanisms (e.g., Global Compact, DS 49001,
CSR Performance Ladder, and Global Reporting Initiative).
Such approaches to strengthen corporate CSR signals may have drawbacks, however.
One drawback is that a firm’s CSR signals proliferate too much and comprise a diversity of signals
that may consequently confuse stakeholders’ perception of what a firm actually stands for or focuses
on in the context of CSR. A second drawback of this approach relates to signal consistency. As a firm
needs to manage an intricate constellation of partly overlapping CSR commitments and performance
requirements to manage, it not only risks confusing stakeholders, but also increases the risks of
emitting inconsistent signals. This may increase suspicion among stakeholders about the firm’s CSR
claims. A firm may for instance emit inconsistent signals as both the scope of the contents and the
perceived status of the standards it adheres to differ to a certain extent. For instance, ISO 14001 focuses
exclusively on environmental management and the DS 49001 that was directly modelled onto ISO
26000 includes the subject of animal welfare. In addition, while ISO 26000 is a worldwide standard
based on global consensus, the CSR Performance Ladder was particularly aimed at Dutch firms and
the certification institutions involved have only just begun to enter an international playing field with
the standard. The signalling firm may even confuse signal receivers in terms of the value it attaches
to certification for CSR purposes, since this is something that is not uncontested in practice and an
ongoing debate among academics [20,31].
5. Discussion, Theoretical Reflection and Research Suggestions
The analysis through an ST lens in this article shows that, particularly due to its guidance
orientation, its focus on intention, its tendency to decouple action from performance and the absence
of enforcement mechanisms ISO 26000 may neither be an efficacious signal nor have a high signal fit.
However, several points of discussion and reflection arise.
A first point of discussion relates to the mixed results of research on the value of certifications.
While some scholars have found labels and certifications in the context of CSR to cause separating
equilibriums [56,99], others have however empirically found or argued that certification may not
always possess high levels of signal fit either. King et al. [100] found that poor rather stellar performers
opt for certification, while Terlaak [71] observed “satisficing signalling” by firms indicating mere
compliance with requirements by well-performing subunits rather than aspirations to realise better
performance for all subunits. Using certification as a signal may thus have drawbacks as well.
Persuaded by the drawbacks of certification, including inconclusiveness in findings whether adopters
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actually do outperform non-adopters, an undesirable focus on compliance rather than on performance
in many organisations and using certification to raise trade barriers and execute power in global
networks, Castka and Balzarova [31] earlier concluded that ISO 26000 should indeed have been
designed as a guidance standard. However, these authors did not include a signalling perspective in
their analysis. From a related angle, Duflo et al. [12] provided experimental empirical evidence that
auditors routinely make unethical decisions favouring client interests. Auditors’ financial dependence
of client firms leads to conflicts of interest and poor incentives to tell the truth and make objective
observations on firms’ compliance. When this type of information is available in the marketplace,
certifications may not turn out to be efficacious mechanisms to create a separating equilibrium and
equip firms with a signal of limited value [101]. Evidence of greenwashing by companies that have
subscribed to the UNGC or other CSR-related initiatives that involve enforcement mechanisms such
as communications on progress may have similar effects as firms obscure their true quality by a
smokescreen of signals. This may, in turn, be beneficial for ISO 26000 as it may increase its value
relative to CSR management standards that have enforcement mechanisms. The adoption of ISO
26000 in practice could however prove to be the ultimate referee: when it is clear that firms that do
possess underlying CSR quality adopt ISO 26000, the standard will gain empirical legitimacy [75].
ISO 26000 may be particularly adopted by firms that already have (certified) social, environmental
and quality management systems in place and thus are already well under way with realising the
CSR agenda. In addition, while the reputed ISO label may serve as an attractive label or cover for
firms that aim to mislead stakeholders and still gain legitimacy in the context of addressing their social
and environmental responsibilities, assumptions about the organisational implications of ISO 26000
(e.g., the implementation of a perceived management systems standard and substantive change) may
also scare and fence off those uninformed.
A second point of discussion relates to the constitutive function that adhering to ISO 26000 may
have for firms despite it being a dysfunctional signal. While intention may not necessarily lead to
action or performance, organisational CSR aspirations may yield behavioural dynamics that help
guide and build performance by “communicating the organisation into being” [86,102]. In this sense,
a firm claiming to adhere to ISO 26000 while not yet possessing adequate underlying CSR quality
may perhaps be better able to live up to its own claim and do so more committedly precisely because
of its adherence to the standard. Both from the viewpoint of firm-supplier relationships and the
perspective of public policy for stimulating transparent and responsible business behaviour, managers
and policymakers may thus encourage the use of ISO 26000, although they should be well aware
that, to an extent, they intentionally allow and embolden a certain level of loose coupling between
intention and action or, as it has been called, corporate hypocrisy [86]. In any case, and illustrated
by this latter argument, using ISO 26000 as an instrument in public-private governance requires
accountability mechanisms to discipline firm behaviour and prevent excessive opportunism and
patterns of free-riding behaviour. In line with the standard’s orientation on stakeholder engagement,
a firm adhering to ISO 26000 could be disciplined in aligning their intentions, actions and performance
and their signalling activity by engaging in sensemaking processes with critical stakeholders, such as
NGOs, employees, client panels and public authorities. As such, an approach may minimise risks
of greenwashing it may also enable firms in coping with the paradox of idiosyncrasy observed in
this article.
5.1. Further Specification of ST Concepts
Analysing ISO 26000 along the lines of key concepts from ST seems to give rise to a further
specification of the applied concepts.
ST distinguishes between signalling the quality and signalling the intent of an organisation.
One could even say that a firm’s intention to engage in CSR using the contents of ISO 26000 as a point
of reference perhaps constitutes the main quality of the firm that is signalled, blurring the analytical
distinction between signals of quality and intent. Although both types of signals can be observed
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apart from each other, one could argue that in a CSR context these types of signals may be mutually
conditioning. For instance, communicating CSR commitments (intent) without communicating action,
demonstrating CSR performance or accountability for social or environmental impacts (quality) leads
companies to run the risk of being accused of greenwashing. This distinction resembles the concept of
credibility which Becker-Olsen et al. [85] defined as the difference between a company’s CSR claim and
its CSR action. In addition, the distinction between intent and quality may prove theoretically tangled
and consequently difficult to discern in the context of CSR as the mere intent of a firm to behave
socially responsible may be perceived as one of its qualities [103]. In addition, the nature of a firm’s
orientation towards CSR (e.g., public-serving, profit-serving or a combination thereof; see [85]) reveals
information about its intent, which may be relevant in stakeholders’ assessments. Such a position could
even be dependent on stakeholders’ orientations towards CSR: some stakeholders may find a firm
more credible when it pursues a business case approach to CSR, while others would prefer the firm
to be engaged in CSR purely for the betterment of society. Instead of distinguishing between signals
of intent and signals of quality, perhaps a more useful distinction in this context could be between
a signal of intent on the one hand and signals of action, performance and impact on the other [86].
Signals of quality could then also be perceived as a construct that encompasses these different signals
and constitute a proxy for the level of within-firm information asymmetries in the context of CSR and
even the alignment of signals of intent and signals of quality. In this latter case, one may speak of
signal of fit, not be confused with signal fit.
A second suggestion relates to a specification of the concepts of signal frequency and consistency.
Signal diversity may be a more appropriate label than signal frequency as the latter is concerned
with repeatedly sending out one and the same signal (which may be called “signal iteration”),
while the former is concerned with emitting a greater variety of signals (which may be called “signal
proliferation”). Signal iteration relates more to the timing of signals, for instance, making sure that
signals have good reach among relevant stakeholders without overloading receivers with information.
Signal proliferation then is the phenomenon that gives rise to investigating signal consistency, as this
may increase the risk of emitting conflicting signals resulting in a diffuse or polymorph aggregate
signal for receivers. In fact, from a theoretical point of view, it is proposed that “signal congruence”
may be a better term for the phenomenon described by Connelly et al. [29] than signal consistency.
To illustrate this in a CSR context: signal consistency seems to apply more to a situation in which
a company publishes a sustainability report with irregular intervals (e.g., not consistently on an
annual or bi-annual basis) or in which a company publishes sustainability reports that are not always
accompanied by assurance statements or include accounts resulting from stakeholder consultations
(i.e., inconsistencies in data quality). The degree of signal congruence hence focuses on the extent to
which different signals present corresponding messages or contents.
5.2. Research Suggestions
This article has argued that, because of the existence of within-firm and between-firm information
asymmetries, it may prove hard for stakeholders to interpret and assess signals relating to unobservable
qualities such as CSR, even when companies signal their adherence to standards. A first suggestion
would therefore be to focus research on identifying strategies for different types to stakeholders to
evaluate corporate CSR claims that are based on non-certifiable standards. This is also a relevant
research question for companies themselves, as companies that take their CSR commitments
seriously would probably be interested in learning how to inform their stakeholders effectively.
Obviously, stakeholder engagement strategies and stakeholder dialogue may prove useful as signals
are created, attributed meaning to and institutionalised in the process of continuously interacting
parties [13,104,105]. However, what if a firm provides only limited options for such engagement and
dialogue? Would the fact that it does so, and thereby breaches a principle behind many CSR standards,
be a signal that becomes stakeholders’ main source for dismissing its CSR claim?
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A second research project could be guided by the question whether signal fit is higher with
non-certifiable CSR standards than with certifiable management systems. Non-certifiable may have
lower exigencies, but may fence off firms with low CSR signal fit as they prefer to send a signal that
is more costly. Since scholarly work appears to show mixed results on this issue, research could be
guided by the question “are companies that adhere to non-certifiable CSR standards more likely to
possess the unobservable qualities than those that adhere to certifiable CSR standards?”
Thirdly, as signal strength appears to be dependent on various aspects (not only certification),
research could focus on empirically assessments of the signal strength of various CSR standards,
both certifiable and non-certifiable and with different enforcement mechanisms (e.g., ISO 26000,
UNGC, SA 8000, and AA 1000 series), using the ST concepts used and refinements suggested in
this article. In addition, research could be directed at the emerging competitive landscape of CSR
standards, investigate what standards will surface for what reasons and the degree to which signal
strength possesses explanatory value for this phenomenon. In particular, future research may not
only be directed towards different types of CSR management standards, but also aim at exploring
related frameworks that are widely used by firms to communicate about their social and environmental
performance. From a signalling perspective, sustainability and integrated reporting frameworks may
serve as prominent signalling devices for firms, in terms of both adopting such frameworks and
the type of information firms communicate in their reports. While several scholars have recently
investigated the relationship between firms’ sustainability reporting and other types of disclosure
(e.g., greenhouse gas emissions) on the one hand and information asymmetries on the other hand in
general terms [59,106,107], none of them have endeavoured into applying ST in detail to this type of
corporate communication.
The main research question that imposes itself based on this article, however, is what effective
signal-enhancing strategies can be formulated in the context of ISO 26000 and other non-certifiable
CSR standards. Given the weak signal that ISO 26000 has been argued to be, what strategies can firms
pursue to strengthen the signal they emit by adhering to this standard? Speculating on these strategies,
and next to an (externally assured) ISO 26000 self-declaration, firms could opt for a certifiable variant of
ISO 26000, although these have mainly been developed in several national contexts by standardisation
bodies until now. A second strategy for firms could be to obtain certification according to substitute
certifiable comprehensive CSR standards developed by other organisations, or use these in combination
with ISO 26000. A third option concerns adhering to multiple certifiable standards in CSR-related
domains, such as quality, environment, accountability, and occupational health and safety. A fourth
strategy for firms could be to have their claim to adhere to ISO 26000 or their self-declaration externally
assured [4]. Empirical research could focus on determining whether and under what conditions firms
would consider different signal-enhancing strategies, the efficacy of (combinations of) these strategies
and the perceptions of stakeholders of them. These strategies are, again, not limited to the adoption of
standards, but also include the application of reporting frameworks and engaging in other types of
sustainability-related disclosures. In these research efforts, scholars may particularly pay attention to
issues related to signal frequency and consistency, including the refinements suggested in this article.
As Connelly et al. noted in this respect: “Sending different signals from the same signaller, or the same signal
from different signallers, could change the way receivers interpret those signals” ([29], p. 59).
6. Conclusions
In the context of public-private governance for sustainability, CSR and sustainability standards
have a particular and potentially promising role to play as form of “governance beyond government”.
Firms have clear incentives to signal their underlying CSR quality and many have opted for adhering
to CSR standards as way of reducing information asymmetries in their relationships with stakeholders.
The ISO 26000 standard is a prominent case in point and may, in the context of realising both public
values and business goals, serve as a signalling device for firms aiming to communicate their CSR
quality. However, despite the high level of legitimacy ISO 26000 possesses based on its inclusive,
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multi-stakeholder-oriented development process and the practical value its CSR framework offers
adopters, firms adhering to the standard risk emitting a rather weak signal. Analysing the standard
with ST shows that the standard satisfies neither characteristic of an efficacious signal (observability
and costliness) and signal honesty and signal fit may be rather low. In addition, the standard appears to
lead to problems of signal frequency and signal consistency. The low exigencies of ISO 26000, including
it lacking an enforcement mechanism, are a root cause of these problems. Firms may consequently be
tempted to signal underlying CSR qualities that they actually do not possess. This can lead ISO 26000
to become a signal of companies with poor CSR performance and even a standard for greenwashing.
In addition, the idiosyncratic approach to CSR that the standard propagates requires a lot of effort
from stakeholders to observe and assess the CSR quality of ISO 26000-adhering firms. The standard
thus adds proof to the obfuscation hypothesis and by creating uninformative pooling equilibriums
does not seem to be suited for differentiation purposes. Against this background, when adopting
or encouraging the use of ISO 26000, firms and governments may well compromise the promise of
public-private governance of sustainability.
The fact that ISO 26000 was not developed as a certifiable management systems standard has led to
the emergence of other CSR standards that make CSR better observable, thus enhancing between-firm
information asymmetries to its disadvantage. The analysis in this article points at the necessity of
using of additional signalling strategies for firms that adhere to ISO 26000, including self-declaration
and the adoption of certifiable (issue-based) CSR standards. However, as the standard necessitates
firms to turn to alternative signalling strategies, stakeholders may be more likely to misinterpret and
get confused by a firms CSR signals.
From the perspective of public-private governance, the question should hence be raised whether
ISO 26000 is an appropriate standard to further engage firms (and other organisations that want
to use this guidance) in the sustainability agenda, for instance by policymakers in the social and
environmental realm. Interestingly, governments have been a contributor to the multi-stakeholder
process that has led to the creation of ISO 26000, too, and the interest of public authorities in private
governance has been on the increase. In addition, certification is not a solution for the signalling
problems voluntary standards engender per se [1]. In the final analysis, it may be said that the
differentiating characteristics of ISO 26000, including the fact that it is not certifiable and allows for
idiosyncratic interpretations of CSR, can easily compromise its value. Images of realising public values
may actually be not much more than a cover for achieving the same business goals as ever. In the
context of public-private governance, such greenwashing may well tarnish not only the credibility
of business, but also that of other partners involved, including governments and non-governmental
organisations. Against the background of the results of the numerous studies mentioned in this
article that point at the drawbacks of private and public-private governance in general and CSR
and sustainability-related standards in particular, the question then is: Where does this leave the
potential value of ISO 26000 for public-private governance? Perhaps a starting point for getting
to the most viable answer to this question can be found in the conclusion reached by Mayer and
Gereffi ([108], p. 19) on private governance: “unless private governance is supplemented and reinforced
by public institutions of governance, it cannot provide adequate governance capacity for the global economy”
However, to avoid solely resorting to the route of legislation and in order to honour the central
idea of public-private governance, ISO 26000 may function as a platform for public and private
institutions to discuss, negotiate and mutually enforce the responsibilities, initiatives and outcomes of
both firms, governments and non-governmental organisations in achieving sustainability. This may
take the form of continuous and transparent stakeholder dialogue as a way of aligning interests and
securing accountability mechanisms that may make the signals emitted credible and less susceptible to
misinterpretation. The agenda offered by the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and the consequent initiatives taken by governments, non-governmental organisations (including
citizen-led initiatives) and firms worldwide to promote and achieve this agenda may be an emerging
(although embryonic) example in this regard. Such an approach may result in the adoption of a variety
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of idiosyncratic public-private governance arrangements, each characterised by their own signalling
strategies [4], including the involved parties auditing each other and communicating the results of this
process in a fully transparent way. Inclusive, global partnerships, either directly targeted at activities
to tackle the SDGs or aimed at creating new public-private governance arrangements (including
standards) may be an example of this.
Paradoxically, as the analysis in this article has shown, ISO 26000 may discourage precisely
those investments that are necessary to develop and send credible signals of current and future CSR
performance that reduce information asymmetries in firm-stakeholder relationships that firms need in
order to capitalise on their CSR efforts. Not being able to capitalise on their efforts may hinder taking
up their role in the public-private governance of sustainability beyond complying with legislation.
However, this does not say that ISO 26000 will not be taken up by firms worldwide—surveys among
businesses actually indicate that the adoption of the standard has gained traction—or that the standard
will be discouraged through public policy or supported by non-governmental organisations. Firms,
their stakeholders, governments and organisations involved in the standardisation of business conduct
should be aware of the signals firms emit by ISO 26000 in order to not let the standard become part of the
problems it set out to solve and exacerbate rather than reduce problems in public-private governance.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Marx, A.; Cuypers, D. Forest certification as a global environmental governance tool: What is the
macro-effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council? Regul. Gov. 2010, 4, 408–434. [CrossRef]
2. Marx, A. Global governance and the certification revolution: Types, trends and challenges. In Handbook on
the Politics of Regulation; Levi-Faur, D., Ed.; Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, 2011; pp. 590–603.
3. Moratis, L. Signalling strategies for ISO 26000: A firm-level approach. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag. 2016,
36, 512–531. [CrossRef]
4. Moratis, L. Consequences of collaborative governance in CSR: An empirical illustration of strategic responses
to institutional pluralism and some theoretical implications. Bus. Soc. Rev. 2016, 121, 415–446. [CrossRef]
5. Johnston, J. Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate
Environmental Performance; Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2006-01; University of
Pennsylvania Law School: Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2005.
6. Malik, M. Value-enhancing capabilities of CSR: A brief review of contemporary literature. J. Bus. Ethics 2015,
127, 419–438. [CrossRef]
7. Perez-Batres, L.; Doh, J.; Miller, V.; Pisani, M. Stakeholder pressures as determinants of CSR strategic choice:
Why do firms choose symbolic versus substantive self-regulatory codes of conduct? J. Bus. Ethics 2012,
110, 157–172. [CrossRef]
8. Terlaak, A. Satisficing Signalling: Corporate Social Strategy and Certified Management Standards. In Academy
of Management Best Paper Proceedings; Academy of Management: Briarcliff Manor, NY, USA, 2007.
9. Cramer, J.; Van der Heijden, A.; Jonker, J. Corporate social responsibility: Making sense through thinking
and acting. Bus. Ethics A Eur. Rev. 2006, 15, 380–389. [CrossRef]
10. Matten, D.; Moon, J. ‘Implicit’ and ‘explicit’ CSR: A conceptual framework for a comparative understanding
of corporate social responsibility. Acad. Manag. Rev. 2008, 33, 404–424. [CrossRef]
11. Okoye, A. Theorizing corporate social responsibility as an essentially contested concept: Is a definition
necessary? J. Bus. Ethics 2009, 89, 613–627. [CrossRef]
12. Duflo, E.; Greenstone, M.; Pande, R.; Ryan, N. Truth-Telling by Third-Party Auditors and the Response of
Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India; MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 13–17;
MIT: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2013.
13. Morsing, M.; Schultz, M. Corporate social responsibility communication: Stakeholder information, response
and involvement strategies. Bus. Ethics A Eur. Rev. 2006, 15, 323–338. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4172 17 of 20
14. Globescan. Credibility Gap Persists around Companies’ CSR Communications. Available online:
http://www.globescan.com/commentary-and-analysis/featured-findings/entry/credibility-gap-
persists-around-companies-csr-communications.html (accessed on 15 September 2018).
15. Basu, K.; Palazzo, G. Corporate social responsibility: A process model of sensemaking. Acad. Manag. Rev.
2008, 33, 122–136. [CrossRef]
16. Jahdi, K.; Acikdilli, G. Marketing communications and corporate social responsibility: Marriage of
convenience or shotgun wedding? J. Bus. Ethics 2009, 88, 103–113. [CrossRef]
17. Rasche, A. Collaborative governance 2.0. Corp. Gov. 2010, 10, 500–511. [CrossRef]
18. Rasche, A. Corporate responsibility standards. In Continental Philosophy and Business Ethics; Painter-Morland, M.,
Ten Bos, R., Eds.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011; pp. 263–284.
19. Idowu, S.; Sitnikov, C.; Moratis, L. (Eds.) ISO 26000: A Standardized View on Corporate Social Responsibility;
Springer: Heidelberg, Germany, 2018.
20. Hahn, R. Standardizing social responsibility? New perspectives on guidance documents and management
system standards for sustainable development. IEEE Trans. Eng. Manag. 2012, 59, 717–727. [CrossRef]
21. Hemphill, T. The ISO 26000 guidance on social responsibility international standard: What are the business
governance implications? Corp. Gov. 2013, 13, 305–317. [CrossRef]
22. Mena, S.; Palazzo, G. Input and output legitimacy of multi-stakeholder initiatives. Bus. Ethics Q. 2012,
22, 527–556. [CrossRef]
23. Mueckenberger, U.; Jastram, S. Transnational norm-building networks and the legitimacy of corporate social
responsibility. J. Bus. Ethics 2010, 97, 223–239. [CrossRef]
24. AFNOR. Engaging in Dialogue—Focus on Our Social Responsibility; AFNOR: Paris, France, 2018.
25. European Commission. An Analysis of Policy References Made by Large EU Companies to Internationally
Recognised CSR Guidelines and Principles; European Commission: Brussels, Belgium, 2013.
26. ISO. ISO 26000 Post-Publication Survey 2011; ISO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2011.
27. ISO. ISO 26000 Post-Publication Survey 2012; ISO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2012.
28. ISO. ISO 26000 and OECD Guidelines—Practical Overview of the Linkages; ISO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2017.
29. Connelly, B.; Certo, T.; Ireland, D.; Reutzel, C. Signaling theory: A review and assessment. J. Manag. 2011,
37, 39–67. [CrossRef]
30. Frynas, J.; Yamahaki, C. Corporate social responsibility: Review and roadmap of theoretical perspectives.
Bus. Ethics A Eur. Rev. 2016, 25, 258–285. [CrossRef]
31. Castka, P.; Balzarova, M. Social responsibility standardization: Guidance or reinforcement through
certification? Hum. Syst. Manag. 2008, 27, 231–242.
32. Akerlof, G. The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Q. J. Econ. 1970,
84, 488–500. [CrossRef]
33. Spence, M. Job market signalling. Q. J. Econ. 1973, 87, 355–374. [CrossRef]
34. Stiglitz, J. Information and economic analysis: A perspective. Econ. J. 1985, 95, 21–41. [CrossRef]
35. Davila, A.; Foster, G.; Gupta, M. Venture capital financing and the growth of startup firms. J. Bus. Vent. 2003,
18, 689–708. [CrossRef]
36. Jones, R.; Murrell, A. Signaling positive corporate social performance: An event study of family-friendly
firms. Bus. Soc. 2001, 40, 59–78. [CrossRef]
37. Reinhardt, F.; Stavins, R.; Vietor, H. Corporate social responsibility through an economic lens. Rev. Environ.
Econ. Policy 2008, 2, 219–239. [CrossRef]
38. Windsor, D. The future of corporate social responsibility. Int. J. Org. Anal. 2001, 9, 225–256. [CrossRef]
39. Busenitz, L.; Fiet, J.; Moesel, D. Signaling in venture capitalist–new venture team funding decisions: Does it
indicate long-term venture outcomes? Entrep. Theory Pract. 2005, 29, 1–12. [CrossRef]
40. Zhang, Y.; Wiersema, M. Stock market reaction to CEO certification: The signaling role of CEO background.
Strateg. Manag. J. 2009, 30, 693–710. [CrossRef]
41. Laufer, W. Social accountability and corporate greenwashing. J. Bus. Ethics 2003, 43, 253–261. [CrossRef]
42. Marquis, C.; Toffel, M. When do Firms Greenwash? Corporate Visibility, Civil Society Scrutiny, and Environmental
Disclosure; Harvard Business School Working Paper 11–115; Harvard Business School: Boston, MA,
USA, 2012.
43. Balboa, M.; Marti, J. Factors that determine the reputation of private equity managers in developing markets.
J. Bus. Vent. 2007, 22, 453–480. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4172 18 of 20
44. Chung, W.; Kalnins, A. Agglomeration effects and performance: A test of the Texas lodging industry.
Strateg. Manag. J. 2001, 22, 969–988. [CrossRef]
45. Fischer, E.; Reuber, R. The good, the bad, and the unfamiliar: The challenges of reputation formation facing
new firms. Entrep. Theory Pract. 2007, 31, 53–75. [CrossRef]
46. Carroll, A. Corporate social responsibility: Evolution of a definitional construct. Bus. Soc. 1999, 38, 268–295.
[CrossRef]
47. Dahlsrud, A. How corporate social responsibility is defined: An analysis of 37 definitions. Corp. Soc. Responsib.
Environ. Manag. 2008, 15, 1–13. [CrossRef]
48. Carroll, A.; Shabana, K. The business case for corporate social responsibility: A review of concepts, research
and practice. Int. J. Manag. Rev. 2010, 12, 85–105. [CrossRef]
49. Lee, M. Review of the theories of corporate social responsibility: Its evolutionary path and the road ahead.
Int. J. Manag. Rev. 2008, 10, 53–73. [CrossRef]
50. Cui, J.; Jo, H.; Na, H. Does corporate social responsibility affect information asymmetry? J. Bus. Ethics 2018,
148, 549–572. [CrossRef]
51. Daugherty, E. Public relations and social responsibility. In Handbook of Public Relations; Heath, R., Ed.;
Sage: Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2001; pp. 389–402.
52. Fan, Y. Ethical branding and corporate reputation. Corp. Commun. Int. J. 2005, 10, 341–350. [CrossRef]
53. Lys, T.; Naughton, J.; Wang, C. Signaling through corporate accountability reporting. J. Acc. Econ. 2015,
60, 56–72. [CrossRef]
54. Pfau, M.; Haigh, M.; Sims, J.; Wigley, S. The influence of corporate social responsibility campaigns on public
opinion. Corp. Reputat. Rev. 2008, 11, 145–154. [CrossRef]
55. Clarke, J.; Gibson-Sweet, M. The use of corporate social disclosures in the management of reputation and
legitimacy: A cross sectoral analysis of UK Top 100 Companies. Bus. Ethics A Eur. Rev. 1999, 8, 5–13.
[CrossRef]
56. Etilé, F.; Teyssier, S. Signaling corporate social responsibility: Testing third-party certification vs. brands.
Scand. J. Econ. 2016, 118, 397–432. [CrossRef]
57. Gugerty, M. Signaling virtue: Voluntary accountability programs among nonprofit organizations. Policy Sci.
2009, 42, 243–273. [CrossRef]
58. Scherer, A.; Palazzo, G. The new political role of business in a globalized world: A review of a new
perspective on CSR and its implications for the firm, governance, and democracy. J. Manag. Stud. 2011,
48, 899–931. [CrossRef]
59. Wang, Z.; Tien-Shih, H.; Sarkis, J. CSR performance and the readability of CSR reports: Too good to be true?
Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Manag. 2018, 25, 66–79. [CrossRef]
60. Rutherford, B. Obfuscation, textual complexity and the role of regulated narrative accounting disclosure in
corporate governance. J. Manag. Gov. 2003, 7, 187–210. [CrossRef]
61. Lydenberg, S. Envisioning socially responsible investing: A model for 2006. J. Corp. Citizensh. 2002, 7, 57–77.
[CrossRef]
62. Frankental, P. Corporate social responsibility—A PR invention? Corp. Commun. Int. J. 2001, 6, 18–23.
[CrossRef]
63. Moon, J.; Crane, A.; Matten, D. Can corporations be citizens? Corporate citizenship as a metaphor for
business participation in society. Bus. Ethics Q. 2005, 15, 427–451. [CrossRef]
64. Murillo, D.; Lozano, J. SMEs and CSR: An approach to CSR in their own words. J. Bus. Ethics 2006, 67, 227–240.
[CrossRef]
65. Barth, R.; Wolff, F. Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe: Rhetoric and Realities; Edward Elgar: Cheltenham,
UK, 2009.
66. Perera, L.; Chaminda, J. Corporate social responsibility and product evaluation: The moderating role of
brand familiarity. Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Manag. 2012, 20, 245–256. [CrossRef]
67. Castka, P.; Balzarova, M. The impact of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 on standardisation of social
responsibility—An inside perspective. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 2008, 113, 74–87. [CrossRef]
68. Mijatovic, I.; Stokic, D. The influence of internal and external codes on CSR practice: The case of companies
operating in Serbia. J. Bus. Ethics 2010, 94, 533–552. [CrossRef]
69. Mueller, M.; Dos Santos, V.; Seuring, S. The contribution of environmental and social standards towards
ensuring legitimacy in supply chain governance. J. Bus. Ethics 2009, 89, 509–523. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4172 19 of 20
70. Pflugrath, G.; Roebuck, P.; Simnett, R. Impact of assurance and assurer’s professional affiliation on financial
analysts’ assessment of credibility of corporate social responsibility information. Audit. A J. Pract. Theory
2011, 30, 239–254. [CrossRef]
71. Terlaak, A. Order without law: The role of certified management standards in shaping socially desired firm
behaviors. Acad. Manag. Rev. 2007, 32, 968–985. [CrossRef]
72. Bovens, M. Analyzing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. Eur. Law J. 2007, 13, 447–468.
[CrossRef]
73. Gilbert, D.; Rasche, A.; Waddock, S. Accountability in a global economy: The emergence of international
accountability standards. Bus. Ethics Q. 2011, 21, 23–44. [CrossRef]
74. Waddock, S. Building a new institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility. Acad. Manag. Perspect.
2008, 22, 87–108. [CrossRef]
75. Hahn, R.; Weidtmann, C. Transnational governance, deliberative democracy, and the legitimacy of ISO 26000:
Analyzing the case of a global multi-stakeholder process. Bus. Soc. 2016, 55, 90–129. [CrossRef]
76. Balzarova, M.; Castka, P. Stakeholders’ influence and contribution to social standards development: The case
of multiple stakeholder approach to ISO 26000 development. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 111, 265–279. [CrossRef]
77. Johnston, A. Constructing Sustainability through CSR: A Critical Appraisal of ISO 26000; University of Oslo
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2011–33; University of Sheffield: Sheffield, UK, 2011.
78. Moratis, L. Out of the ordinary? An appraisal of the ISO 26000 definition of (corporate) social responsibility.
Int. J. Law Manag. 2013, 58, 26–47. [CrossRef]
79. Webb, K. ISO 26000: Bridging the Public/private Divide in Transnational Business Governance Interactions;
Osgoode Hall Law School Research Paper Series No. 21/2012; Osgoode Hall Law School: Toronto, ON,
Canada, 2012.
80. ISO. ISO 26000—Guidance on Social Responsibility; ISO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2010.
81. DiMaggio, P.; Powell, W. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in
organizational fields. Am. Soc. Rev. 1983, 48, 147–160. [CrossRef]
82. Meyer, J.; Rowan, B. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. Am. J. Soc.
1977, 83, 340–363. [CrossRef]
83. Westphal, J.; Zajac, E. Decoupling policy from practice: The case of stock repurchase programs. Adm. Sci. Q.
2001, 46, 202–228. [CrossRef]
84. Schwartz, B.; Tilling, K. ‘ISO-lating’ corporate social responsibility in the organizational context: A dissenting
interpretation of ISO 26000. Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Manag. 2009, 16, 289–299. [CrossRef]
85. Becker-Olsen, K.; Cudmore, A.; Hill, R. The impact of perceived corporate social responsibility on consumer
behaviour. J. Bus. Res. 2006, 59, 46–53. [CrossRef]
86. Christensen, L.; Morsing, M.; Thyssen, O. CSR as aspirational talk. Organization 2013, 20, 372–393. [CrossRef]
87. Castka, P.; Balzarova, M. A critical look on quality through CSR lenses: Key challenges stemming from the
development of ISO 26000. Int. J. Qual. Reliab. Manag. 2007, 24, 738–752. [CrossRef]
88. McAdam, R.; Leonard, D. Corporate social responsibility in a total quality management context:
Opportunities for sustainable growth. Corp. Gov. 2003, 3, 36–45. [CrossRef]
89. Van der Wiele, T.; Kok, P.; McKenna, R.; Brown, A. A corporate social responsibility audit within a quality
management framework. J. Bus. Ethics 2001, 31, 285–297. [CrossRef]
90. Terlaak, A.; King, A. The effect of certification with the ISO 9000 quality management standard: A signaling
approach. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2006, 60, 579–602. [CrossRef]
91. Riley, J. Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signalling. J. Econ. Lit. 2001, 39, 432–478. [CrossRef]
92. Kirmani, A.; Rao, A. No pain, no gain: A critical review of the literature on signaling unobservable product
quality. J. Mark. 2000, 64, 66–79. [CrossRef]
93. Henriques, A. Standards for Change: ISO 26000 and Sustainable Development; International Institute for
Environment and Development: London, UK, 2012.
94. Bakar, A.; Ameer, R. Readability of corporate social responsibility communication in Malaysia. Corp. Soc.
Responsib. Environ. Manag. 2011, 18, 50–60. [CrossRef]
95. Barkemeyer, R.; Comyns, B.; Figge, F.; Napolitano, G. CEO statements in corporate sustainability
reports—Substantive information or background noise? Acad. Manag. 2012, 38, 241–257. [CrossRef]
96. Perera, O. How Material is ISO 26000 Social Responsibility to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises?
IISD: Winnipeg, MB, Canada, 2008.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4172 20 of 20
97. Egyedi, T.; Toffaletti, S. Standardising social responsibility: Analysing ISO representation issues from an
SME perspective. In Proceedings 13th EURAS Workshop on Standardisation; Jakobs, K., Soederstroem, E., Eds.;
Wissenschafts Verlag Mainz: Aachen, Germany, 2008; pp. 121–136.
98. Delmas, M.; Montes-Sancho, M. An institutional perspective on the diffusion of international management
system standards: The case of the environmental management standard ISO 14001. Bus. Ethics Q. 2011,
21, 103–132. [CrossRef]
99. Miles, M.; Munilla, L. The potential impact of social accountability certification on marketing: A short note.
J. Bus. Ethics 2004, 50, 1–11. [CrossRef]
100. King, A.; Lenox, L.; Terlaak, A. The strategic use of decentralized institutions: Exploring certification with
the ISO 14001 management standard. Acad. Manag. J. 2005, 48, 1091–1106. [CrossRef]
101. Delmas, M. Barriers and incentives to the adoption of ISO 14001 in the United States. Duke Environ. Law
Policy Forum 2000, 11, 1–38.
102. Schoeneborn, D.; Trittin, H. Transcending transmission: Towards a constitutive perspective on CSR
communication. Corp. Commun. Int. J. 2011, 18, 193–211. [CrossRef]
103. Idowu, S.; Papasolomou, I. Are the corporate social responsibility matters based on good intentions or false
pretences? An empirical study of the motivations behind the issuing of CSR reports by UK companies.
Corp. Gov. 2007, 7, 136–147. [CrossRef]
104. Basdeo, D.; Smith, K.; Grimm, C.; Rindova, V.; Derfus, P. The impact of market actions on firm reputation.
Strateg. Manag. J. 2006, 27, 1205–1219. [CrossRef]
105. Nijhof, A.; Jeurissen, R. A sensemaking perspective on corporate social responsibility: Introduction to the
special issue. Bus. Ethics A Eur. Rev. 2006, 15, 316–322. [CrossRef]
106. Borghei, Z.; Leung, P.; Guthrie, J. Does voluntary greenhouse gas emissions disclosure reduce information
asymmetry? Australian evidence. Afro-Asian J. Finnanc. Acc. 2018, 8, 123–147. [CrossRef]
107. Michaels, A.; Grüning, M. Relationship of corporate social responsibility disclosure on information
asymmetry and the cost of capital. J. Manag. Control 2017, 28, 251–274. [CrossRef]
108. Mayer, F.; Gereffi, G. Regulation and economic globalization: Prospects and limits of private governance.
Bus. Polit. 2010, 12, 1–25. [CrossRef]
© 2018 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
